We study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a Nash equilibrium, i.e., on the number of bits that need to be transmitted, and thus also on the required number of steps. Specifically, we show lower bounds that are exponential in the number of players in each one of the following cases: (1) reaching a pure Nash equilibrium; (2) reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian setting; and (3) reaching a mixed Nash equilibrium. We then show that, in contrast, the communication complexity of reaching a correlated equilibrium is polynomial in the number of players.
INTRODUCTION
Equilibrium is a central concept in interactions between decision-makers. The definition of equilibrium is static: it is characterized by the property that the participants ("players") have no incentive to depart from it. No less fundamental, however, are the dynamic issues of how such an equilibrium arises (see, e.g., [11, 25] ). Since decisions are assumed to be taken independently by the participants, it is only natural to study dynamics in decentralized environments, where each decision-maker has only partial informationfor instance, he knows only his own preferences and not those of the other players. As a result, no player can find an equilibrium on his own, and the resulting dynamics become complex and need not converge to a rest-point (i.e., an equilibrium).
Significant progress has been made in understanding the dynamic aspects of one equilibrium concept, that of correlated equilibrium [1] . A correlated equilibrium obtains when players receive signals before the game is played; these signals, which may be correlated, do not affect the payoffs in the game. Of course, the players may well use these signals when making their strategic choices. To date, there are several efficient algorithms [8, 14, 15, 3, 4, 23, 24, 2, 25, 13] that, in all games, converge fast to (approximate) correlated equilibria.
In contrast, convergence to Nash equilibrium is a much more complex and less clear-cut issue. 1 As we have stated above, a natural assumption that most dynamics satisfy is that of uncoupledness [16] : each player is assumed to know initially only his own payoff function, and not those of the other players.
2 On the one hand, it has been shown that it is impossible for uncoupled dynamics that are deterministic and continuous 3 always to converge to a Nash equilibrium, even when it is unique [16] . On the other hand, there are a number of uncoupled dynamics that converge to Nash equilibria; these dynamics use various techniques such as hypothesis-testing, regret-testing, and other variants of exhaustive or stochastic search [9, 10, 25, 7, 17, 12] . Since all these dynamics perform some form of search over all action combinations, it follows that the number of steps until a Nash equilibrium is reached is exponential in the number of players (when the number of actions of each player is kept fixed). In the current work we will show that this is a general phenomenon and not a deficiency of the existing literature: there is an exponential lower bound on the speed of convergence to Nash equilibria.
To make this precise, define a Nash equilibrium procedure as a dynamic process whereby the players reach a Nash equilibrium, whether pure or mixed. 4 We study the number of steps needed before the procedure terminates at the appropriate equilibrium. Again, we are considering uncoupled procedures: each player's payoff function is private, initially known only to him. We use the theory of communication complexity to derive lower bounds on the amount of communication, measured in terms of the number of transmission bits-and thus also the number of steps-that the players have to perform in order to reach a Nash equilibrium. This important connection was first observed in [6] , where various lower bounds for two-person games are derived (as the number of actions increases). Here we analyze general n-person games.
Our results provide lower bounds that are exponential in the number of players (we keep the number of actions of each player bounded, e.g., two) for the communication complexity in each of the following cases: (1) reaching a pure Nash equilibrium-in general games, and also in the restricted class of games having the "finite improvement property" (Section 3 and Appendix A); (2) reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian setup (Section 4); and (3) reaching a mixed Nash equilibrium (Section 5). In the full version of the paper we exhibit simple procedures that yield upper bounds that are also exponential (for both pure Nash equilibria and mixed Nash equilibria). The proofs omitted from this extended abstract and additional material can also be found there.
These exponential lower bounds may seem unsurprising, given that the size of the input (i.e., the players' private payoff functions) is also exponential. We thus analyze the communication complexity of reaching correlated equilibria, and we show that it is, in contrast, only polynomial in the number of players (Section 6). Therefore, the exponential communication complexity of Nash equilibrium procedures is a result of the equilibrium requirement, and not of the size of the input.
In summary, this paper may be viewed as providing further evidence of the intrinsic difficulty of reaching Nash equilibria, in contrast to correlated equilibria. 
PRELIMINARIES

Game-Theoretic Setting
The basic setting is as follows. There are n ≥ 2 players, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each player i has a finite set of actions Ai with |A i | ≥ 2, and the joint action space is A = Q n i=1 A i . Let ∆ i denote the set of probability distributions over A i 4 We emphasize that we make no assumptions about the players' incentives. We obtain lower bounds, which give the minimum it takes to reach an equilibrium-no matter what the incentives are (see [6] ). 5 See [17] , Section 5(g), particularly the last sentence there.
Most of the games we introduce will be binary-action games, where the action space of each player i is Ai = {0, 1}, and so A = {0, 1} n ; in this case a mixed action of player i is given by 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, interpreted as the probability that a i = 1.
Each player i has a payoff (or utility) function u i which maps A to the real numbers, i.e., u i : A → R. We extend ui to ∆ in a multilinear way, by defining ui(p1, . . . , pn) = E[ui(a1, . . . , an)] for each (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ ∆, where the expectation E is taken with respect to the product distribution p 1 × · · · × p n on A. We denote this game by G = (n,
For a joint action a = (a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an) ∈ A, let a
−i
be the joint action of all players except player i, i.e., a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ). For each player i, the (pure) best-reply correspondence maps a joint action a −i of the other players to the set BR(a
for every player i and any qi ∈ ∆i. Finally, we define the concepts of "improvement step" and "improvement path." Given a joint action a ∈ A, an improvement step of player i is an action
; we refer to i as the improving player. An improvement path is a sequence of improvement steps (where the improvement steps can be performed by different players). A game G has the finite improvement property if all the improvement paths are finite;
6 such a game always possesses a pure Nash equilibrium.
Communication Complexity Background
In the "classical" setting in communication complexity there are two agents, 7 one holding an input x ∈ {0, 1} K and the other holding an input y ∈ {0, 1} K , where K is a finite set. Their task is to compute a joint function of their inputs f (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}. The agents send messages to one another, and we assume that at the end of the communication they each have the value of f (x, y). The communication complexity of a deterministic communication protocol Π for computing f (x, y) is the number of bits sent during the computation of f (x, y) by Π; denote this number of bits by CC(Π, f, x, y). The communication complexity CC(Π, f ) of a protocol Π for computing a function f is defined as the worst case over all possible inputs (x, y) ∈ {0, f, x, y) . Finally, the communication complexity CC(f ) of computing a function f is the minimum over all protocols Π for computing f , i.e., CC(f ) = min Π CC(Π, f ).
A well-studied function in communication complexity is the disjointness function. Let S be a finite set; the S-disjointness function DISJ S is defined on the subsets of S (i.e., on {0, 1} S × {0, 1} S ) by DISJ S (S 1 , S 2 ) = 1 if the two inputs S 1 , S 2 ⊂ S are disjoint sets, i.e., S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅, and DISJS (S1, S2) = 0 otherwise. There is a large literature on the communication complexity of the disjointness function (see [20] ). We state here one result that will be used to derive bounds in our setting (see [20] , Chapter 1.3). 
Nash Equilibrium Procedures
A Nash equilibrium procedure is a dynamic process by which the players reach a Nash equilibrium of the game, whether pure or mixed (both cases will be considered below). Fix the number of players n and the action spaces A i ; a game G is thus identified with its payoff functions (u 1 , . . . , u n ). Let G be a family of games to which the procedure should apply. The basic assumption is that of uncoupledness: each player knows only his own payoff function ui [16, 17] .
Formally, the n players who participate in a Nash equilibrium procedure have the following information and capabilities. The "input" of the procedure is a game G = (u1, . . . , un) in the family G. Initially, each player i has access only to his own "private" payoff function 8 u i . In each round t = 1, 2, . . ., every player i performs an action 9,10 a i,t ∈ A i . At the end of round t all the players observe each other's actions; i.e., they all observe the joint action (a1,t, . . . , an,t) ∈ A.
In a mixed Nash equilibrium procedure Π for G, the "output" of each player i is a distribution p i ∈ ∆ i , such that (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ ∆ is a mixed Nash equilibrium of the game G = (u1, . . . , un) that was given as input.
11 In a pure Nash equilibrium procedure Π for G, the "output" of player i is either (1) a pure action a i ∈ A i , or (2) a declaration of "no pure Nash equilibrium." In case (1), the joint output (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A is a pure Nash equilibrium of G, whereas in case (2) G has no pure Nash equilibrium. Let pnep and mnep denote the collection of pure and mixed Nash equilibrium procedures, respectively.
The communication complexity CC(Π, G) of a Nash equilibrium procedure Π applied to a game G is the number of bits communicated until Π terminates when the input is G. Given a family of games G, the communication complexity of a Nash equilibrium procedure Π for the family G is the worstcase communication complexity of Π over all games G ∈ G, i.e., CC(Π, G) = maxG∈G CC(Π, G). Finally, CC(pure,G), the communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium procedures for a family of games G, is the minimal communication complexity of any pure Nash equilibrium procedure Π for the family of games G, i.e., CC(pure, G) = minΠ∈pnep CC(Π, G); similarly, CC(mixed, G) = minΠ∈mnep CC(Π, G) is the communication complexity of mixed Nash equilibrium procedures for G.
One may measure the communication complexity of Nash procedures also in terms of the number of rounds; this may be more natural from the game-theoretic viewpoint. Formally, the time communication complexity tCC(Π, G) of a Nash equilibrium procedure Π applied to a game G is the number of time periods until Π terminates. The two communication complexity measures, CC and tCC, are closely related: in each time period the players transmit at least 1 bit and at most P i log |Ai| = log |A| bits.
12
Proposition 2. The (bit) communication complexity CC and the time communication complexity tCC satisfy:
(A similar connection for two-player games was observed in [6] . ) We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of the communication complexity of Nash equilibrium procedures as the number of players n increases, while the size of the action sets is fixed. Let Γ n s be the family of all n-person games where each player has at most s actions, i.e., |A i | ≤ s for all i. We want to estimate the communication complexity of Nash equilibrium procedures on the class Γ n s as n increases and s is fixed. Our results will deal with the class Γ n 2 of binary-action games (except for Theorem 4, where we need 4 actions). Since the communication complexity is defined as the worst case over all games, any lower bound for Γ n 2 is clearly also a lower bound for Γ n s for every s ≥ 2. In the complete version of the paper we discuss the extension of our results to s ≥ 2 actions (we get better lower bounds that depend on s).
PURE EQUILIBRIA
In this section we derive exponential lower bounds on the communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium procedures. Our result is Theorem 3. Any pure Nash equilibrium procedure has communication complexity Ω(2 n ), i.e., for every s ≥ 2,
Proposition 2 implies that the time communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium procedures is tCC(pure, Γ n 2 ) = Ω(2 n /n) = Ω(2 n−log n ). At this point one may conjecture that restricting the class of games to those that have pure Nash equilibria may decrease the communication complexity. However, this is not so. Even if one considers only the restricted class FIP n s of n-person s-action games that have the "finite improvement property" (see Section 2.1) and thus always possess pure Nash equilibria, the lower bound remains exponential. Specifically, for games with s ≥ 4 actions, we have Theorem 3 will be proved in Section 3.2 below using a simple reduction from the disjointness problem (recall Theorem 1), whereas Theorem 4 will require a much more complex construction, which we present in the Appendix A (the full proof appears in the complete version of the paper).
Reductions
We now show how to reduce the disjointness problem to the problem of finding pure Nash equilibria. Divide the player set {1, . . . , n} into two sets T1 and T2 of size n/2 each (assume for simplicity that n is even), say T 1 = {1, . . . , n/2} and T 2 = {n/2 + 1, . . . , n}. It will be convenient to rename the players such that the players in T are ( , i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2} and ∈ {1, 2}. For any two sets S1, S2 ⊂ San input of the S-disjointness problem-the reduction will define a game G = (n, {A i } i , {u i } i ), such that two properties are satisfied:
• Reducibility: S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ if and only if G has a pure Nash equilibrium.
• Constructibility: The payoff function of each player ( , i) in T is constructible from S (i.e., for every a ∈ A the number u ,i (a) is computable, by a finite algorithm, from a, S , and i).
The reducibility property enables us to relate the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium procedure on G with the outcome of the S-disjointness function on S 1 and S 2 . Namely, if the players reach a pure Nash equilibrium in G then the sets S 1 and S 2 are not disjoint, and if they do not reach a pure Nash equilibrium then the sets are disjoint. The constructibility property ensures that given a pure Nash equilibrium procedure Π N E we are able to generate a protocol Π D for the disjointness problem, with the same communication complexity. More specifically, given Π N E we create a protocol ΠD by having agent ∈ {1, 2} simulate all the players in T (he can do so by the constructibility property). We summarize this in the following claim, which is based on Theorem 1.
Claim 5. Assume that there exists a reduction from the S-disjointness problem to n-person pure Nash equilibrium procedures that satisfies the reducibility and constructibility properties. Then any pure Nash equilibrium procedure has communication complexity of at least |S| bits.
Matching Pennies Reduction
We now provide a simple reduction, which we call the matching pennies reduction, and establish Theorem 3.
Take S = {0, 1} n ; for each S 1 , S 2 ⊂ S the reduction will generate a binary-action game G in Γ n 2 as follows. The action spaces are A i = {0, 1} for all i, and a joint action is thus a ∈ A = {0, 1}
n . The payoff u ,i (a) of each player ( , i) in T will be high (specifically, 2) if the joint action a lies in the set S , and low (specifically, 0) if it does not. In the latter case, two distinguished players in T , say ( , 1) and ( , 2), will in addition play a matching pennies game between themselves.
Formally, for = 1, 2, the payoff function u ,i of a player ( , i) in T is defined as follows. For i ≥ 3, put Claim 6. For n ≥ 4, the reducibility and constructibility properties hold for the matching pennies reduction.
Proof. The payoff functions of the players in T depend on S only, and so the constructibility property holds. For the reducibility property, note that a is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if a ∈ S1 ∩ S2 (indeed, if a ∈ S1 ∩ S2, then every player gets the maximal payoff of 2; otherwise, a / ∈ S for some , and then either ( , 1) or ( , 2) benefits by deviating).
We can now prove Theorem 3. Proof of Theorem 3: Follows from Claims 5 and 6 (recall that S = {0, 1} n ).
PURE EQUILIBRIA IN A BAYESIAN SETTING
We now consider a Bayesian setting where the game (i.e., the payoff functions) is chosen according to a probability distribution that is known to all players. While the communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium procedures has been shown to be exponential in the worst case, it is conceivable that the expected communication complexity will be smaller (where the expectation is taken over the randomized selection of the payoff functions). However, that turns out not to be the case. We will exhibit a simple distribution for which the expected communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium procedures is exponential. Our result is the following. Theorem 7. There exists a probability distribution over games such that any pure Nash equilibrium procedure has expected communication complexity Ω(2 n ); i.e., there exists a probability distribution P over the family of binary-action games
where the expectation E is taken over games G ∈ Γ n 2 chosen according to the probability distribution P.
(Note that Theorem 3 is implied by Theorem 7.) Unlike the results in the previous section, here we will not apply a reduction, but rather provide a direct proof, using techniques from "distributional communication complexity" (see [20] , Chapter 3.4).
Some further background from communication complexity is needed at this point. A combinatorial rectangle is X = X 1 × · · · × X n , where each X i is a subset of inputs of player i. Every sequence of messages in a communication protocol can be described by a combinatorial rectangle, namely, all inputs generating that sequence of messages. Given a function f of n inputs x1, . . . , xn, a combinatorial rectangle X is called monochromatic if f (x) has the same value for all x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X . A minimal covering of a function f using combinatorial rectangles is the minimum number of monochromatic combinatorial rectangles needed to represent f (i.e., the minimal number of monochromatic rectangles whose union covers the space of all possible inputs). Clearly, the logarithm of this number is a lower bound on the communication complexity of f (since, roughly speaking, every bit of communication can only split combinatorial rectangles into two; for more details see [20] , Chapter 1).
In our setting, the combinatorial rectangles are U = U1 × · · · × U n , where each U i is a set of payoff functions of player i. A monochromatic combinatorial rectangle is labeled by either (1) a pure joint action a ∈ A (when a is a Nash equilibrium for every game (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U ), or (2) "no pure Nash equilibrium" (when no game (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U has a pure Nash equilibrium).
Informally, the lower bound on the expected communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium procedures will be a consequence of the fact that it will be "hard" for the players to agree that there is no pure Nash equilibrium. We will construct a probability distribution over payoff functions such that, first, the probability that there is no pure Nash equilibrium is bounded away from 0 as the number of players n increases. And second, we will show that any combinatorial rectangle that is labeled "no pure Nash equilibrium" has a low probability. This will yield a lower bound on the number of monochromatic combinatorial rectangles, and thus on the communication complexity.
Formally, our probability distribution P is defined on the family Γ n each player i has a unique best reply, and
/2. We start by showing that the probability that there are no pure Nash equilibria is bounded away from 0. Lemma 8. There exists a constant α > 0 such that the probability that there are no pure Nash equilibria is at least α for all n ≥ 2.
Next we show that every combinatorial rectangle labeled "no pure Nash equilibrium" has low probability.
Combining the two lemmata allows us to prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7: By Lemma 8, the total probability of the event that there is no pure Nash equilibrium is bounded from below by α > 0. By Lemma 9, each combinatorial rectangle labeled "no pure Nash equilibrium" has probability at most 2 −2 n−1 . Therefore R, the number of such rectangles, satisfies R ≥ α2 2 n−1 ; this gives a lower bound on the expected communication complexity of log R = Ω(2 n ) (see [20] , Chapter 2.1, for details).
MIXED EQUILIBRIA
Before we introduce our result for mixed Nash equilibrium procedures, a certain preliminary discussion is in order. In the case of mixed Nash equilibria the values of the payoff functions play a crucial role. Consider the following variant of the matching pennies game
where M is a positive integer. There is a unique Nash equilibrium: (
/2) for the row player and (M/(M +1), 1/(M + 1)) for the column player. Since the parameter M appears only in the payoff function of the row player, and in equilibrium the column player needs to know the precise value of M , it follows that log M bits have to be communicated. This is a somewhat unsatisfactory result, since the number of bits needed to encode one of the values of the payoff function of the row player is also log M . However, had it been commonly known, for instance, that the payoff functions under consideration have either 1 or M in that entry, then only one bit would have sufficed. We therefore distinguish between two concepts, "magnitude" and "encoding."
Let U i be a family of payoff functions of player i. The magnitude of a rational number ρ is mag(ρ) = log |M | + log |K|, where ρ = M/K is a reduced fraction (i.e., M and K have no common divisor higher than 1), and the magnitude of the family U i is mag(U i ) = max u i ∈U i ,a∈A mag(u i (a)). For each a ∈ A, the encoding of the payoff of player i at a is enc(U i , a) = log |{u i (a) : u i ∈ U i }|; i.e., the number of bits required to encode the possible values of ui(a) as ui varies over Ui; the encoding of the family Ui is enc(Ui) = max a∈A enc(U i , a). For example, if every payoff function u i in U i has two values 1 and M (i.e., u i (a) ∈ {1, M } for all u i ∈ U i and all a ∈ A), then the encoding of U i is enc(U i ) = 1 bit, whereas its magnitude is mag(Ui) = log M bits. Finally, if U = U 1 × · · · × U n is a family of games, then enc(U) = max 1≤i≤n enc(U i ) and mag(U) = max 1≤i≤n mag(U i ).
When deriving lower bounds on the communication complexity of mixed Nash equilibrium procedures, one would like the encoding as well as the magnitude to be as low as possible (so that a high complexity will not be just a trivial consequence, as in the example above). Specifically, we will construct a large family of games U that has an encoding of 1 bit and a magnitude of O(n) bits, such that each game in U will have a different unique Nash equilibrium. This will imply that, in order to reach the correct Nash equilibrium, the number of bits to be transmitted must be at least the logarithm of the size of the family U. Formally, our result is Theorem 10. For every n ≥ 2 there exists a family of binary-action games U n ⊂ Γ n 2 whose encoding is 1 bit and whose magnitude is O(n) bits (i.e., enc(U n ) = 1 and mag(U n ) = O(n)), such that any mixed Nash equilibrium procedure over U n has communication complexity Ω(2 n ), i.e.,
Our construction is based on a generalization of Jordan's game [19] in which we modify the payoff of one of the players. For n ≥ 2, the n-person Jordan game J n is a binary-action game with payoff functions ui(a) = 1 {a i =a i−1 } (a) for all players i = 2 and u2(a) = 1 {a 2 =a 1 } (a) for player 2 (we write 1 X for the indicator function of the event X; e.g., 1 {a 1 =an} (a) = 1 if a 1 = a n and 1 {a 1 =an} (a) = 0 otherwise; and we put a 0 ≡ a n ). Thus player 2 wants to "mismatch" the action of player 1, whereas every other player i = 2 wants to "match" the action of the previous player i − 1. 1 {a 2 =a 1 } (a) + 1 {a 1 =a 2 =1} (a) · f (a 3 , . . . , a n )(2) (only the payoff of player 2 has been modified).
The following lemma shows that a modified Jordan game has a unique Nash equilibrium, and gives an explicit formula for it. For every function f as above, let (a 3 , . . . , a n ) be the average of the values of f ; equivalently, this is the expected value of f when every player i randomizes uniformly, i.e., p i = 
To construct our family of games, we vary the function f over a set F of functions; thus, for each i = 2, the family Ui = {ui} is a singleton, whereas the family U2 = {u
f ∈ F} consists of all payoff functions u f 2 of player 2 that are obtained for all f ∈ F . The property of the family F will be that, for each function f ∈ F , when we substitute f in (3) we get a different value for p1. The lower bound on the communication complexity will follow from the fact that for each f ∈ F the communication to player 1 must be different. (Indeed, player 1 needs to reach a different value of p1 for each f , and always starts with the same information.) This will imply that the number of bits that have to be communicated is at least log |F |. To formalize this, we will call a set of functions F separating if for any two functions f1 = f2 in F we have µ(f1) = µ(f2). Thus Claim 12. Let U be given as above by a separating set of functions F . Then the communication complexity of any mixed Nash equilibrium procedure on U is at least log |F|.
We now construct our family of functions. For every
n−2−i be the integer corresponding to the binary string x. Let H be the set of Boolean functions h :
for each x ∈ {0, 1} n−2 , where prime(k) is the k-th prime, starting for convenience with prime(0) = 2 (thus prime(1) = 3, prime(2) = 5, and so on; note that indeed f h (x) ∈ [0, 1)). Let F H = {f h : h ∈ H}. The following lemma shows that FH is a separating family.
14 This game has a unique Nash equilibrium ( /2) (this also follows from Lemma 11 below). 15 Recall that pi stands for the probability of action 1, i.e.,
Lemma 13. The family F H is separating; i. 
e., for any two Boolean functions h
Next, the magnitude of F H is O(n) bits, since prime(k) = O(k log k) by the Prime Number Theorem and so log(prime 
CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA
In this section we study the communication complexity of reaching a correlated equilibrium, and prove that it is polynomial rather than exponential. This shows that the exponential bounds for Nash equilibrium procedures are not due just to the complexity of the input, i.e., to the payoff functions being of exponential size, but rather to the intrinsic complexity of reaching Nash equilibria.
Based on the polynomial-time algorithm of Papadimitriou [22] for computing correlated equilibria of certain "succinct polynomial games," we derive a correlated equilibrium procedure with polynomial communication complexity, for all games with integer payoffs. Specifically, let U n u ⊂ Γ n 2 be the family of n-person binary-action games with integer payoffs of magnitude at most u bits, i.e., max 1≤i≤n mag(u i ) ≤ u; our correlated equilibrium procedure will have a commmunication complexity that is polynomial in the number of players n and the magnitude of the payoffs u (for simplicity we again consider only binary-action games; otherwise, it would be polynomial in n, u, and max 1≤i≤n |A i |).
We start by recalling the definition of a correlated equilibrium; see Aumann [1] . Given a game G = (n, {Ai}i, {ui}i), a distribution Q over the space of joint actions A = Q n i=1 Ai is (the distribution of) a correlated equilibrium of G if for each player i and all
where E Q denotes expectation with respect to the distribution Q). Equivalently, consider the "extended game" where, before G is played, a joint action a = (a 1 , ..., a n ) ∈ A is randomly chosen according to Q and each player i is given a "recommendation" to play a i , his coordinate of the chosen a; then Q is a correlated equilibrium of G if and only if the combination of strategies where each player always plays according to his recommendation constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the extended game.
A correlated equilibrium procedure Π is defined in the same way as a Nash equilibrium procedure, except that now the output of each player is a distribution Q, such that Q is a correlated equilibrium of the game G = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) that was given as input. 16 Let cep be the collection of correlated equilibrium procedures. Similarly to CC(mixed, G) 16 Finite games always possess correlated equilibria. and CC(pure, G), we define the communication complexity of correlated equilibrium procedures for a family of games G as CC(correlated, G) = minΠ∈cep CC(Π, G) = minΠ∈cep maxG∈G CC(Π, G).
We come now to the construction of [22] , which consists of running an ellipsoid algorithm in the Hart-Schmeidler setup [18] . In our communication complexity framework, every player can run internally the computations of the algorithm at no cost. However, since the payoff function ui is known only to player i, only i can compute his own expected payoffs-which he can then broadcast to all players. The communication complexity counts only the number of bits transmitted, and therefore, as we will see, there is no need to restrict ourselves to "succinct games of polynomial type" as in [22] .
We define the procedure Π corr as follows. All players simulate the algorithm of [22] . At each step of the ellipsoid algorithm, an n-tuple of mixed strategies p = (p1, ..., pn) ∈ ∆ = Q n i=1 ∆ i is generated (the whole vector p is computed internally by-and thus known to-each player). Every player i then computes his expected payoff u i (p) and broadcasts it. In terms of communication complexity, again, the local computation of p and ui(p) has no cost; only the transmission of u i (p) counts.
Papadimitriou [22] proves, first, that a correlated equilibrium is reached in a number of steps that is bounded by a polynomial in n and u; and second, that the n-tuples of mixed strategies p ∈ ∆ generated at every step have a magnitude mag(p) = O(nu) bits. Therefore, when the payoffs u i (a) for all a ∈ A are integers of at most u bits, the expected payoff u i (p) for p ∈ ∆ requires at most O(n mag(p)+u+n) = O(n 2 u) bits (since it is a weighted sum of 2 n entries). Altogether, this implies that the total number of bits transmitted in the procedure Π corr is bounded by a polynomial in n and u, and we have shown In the full version of the paper we present further results on the communication complexity of reaching correlated equilibria. Specifically, in the classes of games of Sections 4 and 5 where the communication complexity of reaching Nash equilibria was shown to be exponential, that of correlated equilibria turns out to be quite low. We also analyze procedures for reaching correlated approximate equilibria.
NASH APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIA
An approximate equilibrium requires each player's gain from deviating to be small. Formally, given ε > 0, a Nash ε-equilibrium is a combination of mixed actions p = (p 1 , ..., p n ) ∈ Π n i=1 ∆ i = ∆ such that u i (p) ≥ u i (q i , p −i ) − ε for every player i and any mixed action q i ∈ ∆ i of i.
It is clearly of interest to study the communication complexity of reaching Nash approximate equilibria, and determine whether or not it is also exponential in the number of players.
However, the techniques we have developed in this work do not seem to be able to deal with the communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium procedures. Indeed, our analysis is based on games that have no pure Nash equilibria (Sections 3 and 4), or whose mixed Nash equilibria require large descriptions (Section 5) -whereas there always exist approximate Nash equilibria, and moreover with succinct representations. players in T 1 can test d r 2 (x 1 x 2 ) = 1 since the identity of the active 2-player r 2 (x 1 x 2 ) = r 2 (z(a)) is just a function of the joint action a. If x1 = x2 then u1,i(a) = 1, and otherwise u1,i(a) = 0 (this will cause the players in T1 to prefer to move from x 1 = x 2 to x 1 = x 2 , unless both x 1 ∈ S 1 and d r 2 (x 1 x 2 ) = 1).
For each player (2, i) in T 2 , we first define an auxiliary function GoodDone2,i 
and x1 = x2, 2 · GoodDone 2,i (a), if x 1 x 2 ∈ L, x 1 = x 2 , and x 2 ∈ S 2 , GoodDone 2,i (a), if x 1 x 2 ∈ L, x 1 = x 2 , and x2 / ∈ S2.
The idea is that when x 1 = x 2 the active 2-player (2, i) = r2(x1x2) should "signal" through his done bit whether or not x2 ∈ S2 (this is needed to let the players in T1 know when a Nash equilibrium has been reached); if he does not signal correctly he is "penalized" by having GoodDone 2,i = 0 instead of 1, which decreases his payoff.
